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A B S T R A C T 
This article considers the influence of macro-economic factors as integrated factors in financial 
sustainability of Informal Finance Groups. Informal Finance Groups (IFGs) have become critical in 
poverty eradication around the world in enhancing access to finance. Despite acknowledgement of this 
fact, IFGs have been faced with financial constraints as a result of micro factors that affect them. This 
puts the financial sustainability of the IFGs at risk.  In this study, financial instability in informal 
finance groups is caused by these factors: loan pricing and loan repayment period. This study required 
to examine the connection between macro-economic factors and financial sustainability of informal 
finance groups in Kiharu Constituency in Murang’a County. Both primary and secondary data were 
collected. Findings indicate that there is relationship between macro-economic factors and financial 
sustainability of informal finance groups. The R value of 0.238 portrayed a positive linear relationship 
between the loan pricing practices and financial sustainability of Informal Finance Groups, and the R 
value of 0.354 portrayed a positive linear relationship between the loan repayment period and financial 
sustainability of Informal Finance Groups. Therefore, the study concluded that the macro-economic 
factors have an influence on financial sustainability of informal finance groups. The study recommends 
that the IFGs should devise a standard criteria for optimal pricing of loans to avoid charging 
exorbitant rates which worsen the poverty situation of the rural residents. Further, the IFGs should 
also set up loan monitoring systems in place to avoid diversion and defaults. 
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Introduction 
In every economy, informal finance groups are expected to play a crucial role of poverty alleviation by making available funds to the 
rural poor. In order to achieve the objective of poverty alleviation and have an impact in the society, IFGs must strive to reach as 
many poor people as possible (Sa-Dhan, 2008). This can only actualize if these groups remain financially sustainable. However, the 
sustainability of informal finance groups has come under scrutiny due to high rates of failure and stagnation. In Kiharu, several IFGs 
among them Mbeti, Mwihoko and Kionereria SHGs (County social services, 2016) disintegrated within a short period of operation.  
Several studies on IFGs have been conducted in Europe, Asia and Africa but not much has been written about financial sustainability 
of these IFGs. Most studies on the sustainability of IFGs have focused on Roscas. These scholars have opted to avoid the Asca model 
of financing and concentrate on the Rosca model, hence a limitation in scope. Their results cannot be generalized to comprehensively 
represent other forms of IFGs such as Ascas and SHGs. Other studies conducted on sustainability of Roscas give conflicting 
conclusions. Anderson, Baland & Karl (2013) concludes that Roscas are never sustainable in the absence of external sanctioning 
mechanisms. On the other hand Schreiner & Nagarajan (2008), concludes that Roscas are sustainable in the absence of formal 
contracting social punishment.  
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Various documented studies have focused on repayment performance (Crowther & Lauesen, 2016); Deininger & Liu, 2009) and 
identified loan pricing, repayment period, recovery mechanisms and loan advances as some of the factors influencing default. 
However, these studies did not expound on the influence of these micro factors on the financial sustainability of IFGs. Previous 
studies have not investigated the influence of loan pricing and repayment period on financial sustainability of IFGs. This study 
contributes to existing literature by comprehensively focusing on sustainability of all forms of IFGs from a different geographical 
region.  
This paper aims to (i) determine the influence of loan pricing on financial sustainability of Informal finance groups, and (ii) examine 
the influence of repayment period on financial sustainability of Informal finance groups. Following the literature review session, this 
papers concludes with final remarks. 
Literature Review 
The Social Capital Theory 
Xing (2018), defines social capital as features of social life-networks, norms and trust that enable participants to act together more 
effectively and to pursue shared objectives. The collective action that enables IFGs to function can be present in the initial stages if 
members are chosen based on pre-existing levels of trust among themselves. Since IFGs are self-regulated social factors are critical 
element of their performance and consequently sustainability.  Outright default was seen as a direct threat to survival of IFGs. Costs 
of default include social mechanisms as sanctions, peer pressure and social ostracism. 
World Bank. (2018), observe that while social pressure was certainly great, people kept a sharp eye on the transaction costs involved 
in enforcing payment. Roscas function provided members value the benefit of membership more than the benefits of defaulting. 
Roscas are fairly flexible form of IFG whose survival relied entirely on social pressures and trust for continued operations.  In group 
lending, loans were advanced to the group without tangible collateral but with reliance on guaranteed repayment through group 
approval and joint liability among  
members. The enforceable trust was the source of social capital.  
Dinçer & Hacioğlu (2014), posited that social capital facilitated access to credit by borrowers. On the other hand, it yielded approval, 
expedited transactions while insuring against risk of default for the lenders. Social capital potentially provided a range of enforcement 
mechanisms for default in environments where recourse to the legal system was costly or impossible.  
This theory was important in this study as it explained the importance of social capital as an intervention for loan recovery and also 
mechanism to minimize cases of loan default that influence the sustainability of IFGs. 
Research and Methodology 
A research design is the conceptual structure in which research is conducted (Kothari, 2013). This study has adopted survey research 
design in examining sampled IFGs leaders. The study was quantitative in nature. The study was conducted in Kiharu Constituency 
in Murang’a County, Kenya. The target population was Leaders of the Informal Finance Groups in Kiharu Constituency, which 
comprises of 600 IFGs (County Social Services Officer, 2016).  
Sampling design 
The Fisher formula was used to obtain a sample size for the study.  Stratified sampling method was used in the research study to 
classify the respondents into various categories based on their geographical distribution as shown in the formula and table below. 
 
Table 1: Population 
Location Population  Sample 
1. Kahuhia 135 19 
2. Mbiri 128 18 
3. Mumbi 123 17 
4. Mukuyu 110 15 
5. Mugoiri 104 14 
Total  600 83 
Source: Author  
Data collection 
The study adopted questionnaires and interview guides as instruments. The respondents were asked to indicate the factors that were 
important in their opinion along a five-point Likert scale. 
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Data analysis methods 
Data analysis was done using descriptive statistics, mainly frequencies, percentages, mean scores, and standard deviation. The results 
have been presented in table form. Descriptive statistics mainly correlation and regression analysis were used to analyse the data. 
Data respondents were summarized using frequencies and percentages determined mean scores were used to analyse the data. 
Standard deviation was used to determine whether there were variations in responses of the informal finance groups being studied.  
Results and Discussion  
Aspects of Loan Pricing and Financial Sustainability 
The study sought to establish the influence of loan pricing and financial sustainability of Informal Finance Groups in Kiharu 
Constituency in Murang’a County. Numerous indicators on loan pricing were considered and the findings were summarised in the 
Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Loan Pricing Practices 
Loan Pricing Practices SA (%) A (%) N (%) D (%) SD (%) Mean Std. Dev. 
Interest is based on loan amount 68.9 25.2 4.9 0 0 3.5231 .64001 
Interest is based on repayment period 4.6 6.2 69.2 10.8 9.2 4.4000 .78661 
Loan interest criteria is different for every loan 9.8 5.5 5.0 68.5 11.2 3.2769 .94386 
Members earn interest on savings 58.5 23.1 18.5 0 0 4.0154 .71790 
Members do not earn interest on savings 0 0 18.4 17.4 64.2 2.8308 96127 
 
A high percentage of 94.1% agreed that interest is based on loan amount with a mean of 3.5231 and standard deviation of .64001. A 
low percentage 10.8% and 15.3% indicated that loan interest is based on repayment period and loan interest is different for every 
loan with a mean of 4.40000 and 3.2769 respectively. 58.5% of the respondents agreed that all members earn interest on savings with 
a mean of 4.0154 and standard deviation of .71790. A high percentage 81.6% dis-agreed that members do not earn interest on their 
savings with a mean of 2.8308 and standard deviation of 0.96127. 
The finding of the study that the loan interest is based on loan amount and that the members earn interest on their savings support 
Gonzalez (2014), who narrated that basing loan interest on loan amount and having the group members earn interest from their 
savings is a major factor in ensuring financial sustainability of Informal Finance Groups. Moreover, this is an indication that most of 
the IFGs arbitrarily set interest rates on loans to avoid complex bookkeeping. Most groups attributed this to cost cutting on expert 
services which saves the groups on additional staff costs that affect sustainability. Majority of the groups distributed a part of their 
profit to members as savings on interest to motivate members to adopt the culture of savings and reduce instances of exit from the 
IFG. Those groups that did not share out profit as interest on savings attributed this to the need for diversifying their sources of 
income to enable the groups remain financially sustainable. 
Table 3:  Model Summary for Loan Pricing Practices 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .238a .057 .048 1.00213 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Loan Pricing Practices 
Table 3 showed the values of R and R² for the model fitted of 0.238 and 0.057 respectively. The R value of 0.238 portrayed a positive 
linear relationship between the loan pricing practices and financial sustainability of Informal Finance Groups. The R² value of 0.057 
implied that 5.7% of the variation in financial sustainability in Informal Finance Groups was explained by the model Y= β0 + β1X1. 
Table 4: ANOVA for Loan Pricing Practices 
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 19.371 5 3.8742 3.632 .003b 
Residual 67.392 64 1.053   
Total 86.763 69    
a. Dependent Variable: Financial Sustainability 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Loan Pricing Practices 
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An ANOVA was carried out which as from Table 6.3 showed the F statistic p value of 0.003. Since the p value of the F- statistic was 
less than 0.05, it implied that considering the simple regression model fitted above loan pricing practices had significant effect on 
financial sustainability of Informal Finance Groups. 
Table 5:  Coefficients for Loan Pricing Practices 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients  
 
T 
 
 
Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 2.546 .400  6.696 .000 
Loan Pricing  .235 .112 .238 2.258 .003 
a. Dependent Variable: Financial Sustainability 
The results of coefficients to the model Y= 2.546 + 0.253X1 indicates that loan pricing is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance as shown on Table 6.4. This was because the p value of 0.003 was less than 0.05. The constant term implied that at zero 
consideration of loan pricing, financial sustainability would be at 2.546, increasing the loan pricing would increase the financial 
sustainability by 0.235. The finding of the study support Johnson, (2008), who noted that loan pricing is paramount in improving the 
financial sustainability of village microfinance groups. This implies that loan pricing is paramount for the financial sustainability on 
Informal Finance Groups. 
Aspects of Loan Repayment Period and Financial Sustainability 
The study sought to establish the influence of loan repayment period on financial sustainability of Informal Finance Groups in Kiharu 
Constituency in Murang’a County. Various constraints on loan repayment period were analysed and the findings were summarised 
in the Table 6 below 
Table 6:  Descriptive Statistics of Loan Repayment Period Practices 
Loan Repayment Period Practices SA(%) A(%) N(%) D(%) SD(%) Mean Std. Dev. 
Frequency of Repayment is weekly 47.2 29.4 23.4 0 0 4.3826 .78393 
Frequency of Repayment is monthly 
 
9.2 
 
44.6 
 
10.8 
 
18.5 
 
16.9 2.7692 1.14249 
Maximum duration of loan is less than 1 year 0 64.6 32.3 3.1 0 3.6154 .55035 
Maximum duration of loan is exactly one year 
 
26.2 
 
38.5 
 
35.4 
 
0 
 
0 
3.9077 .78508 
Maximum duration of loan is more than one year 
 
0 
 
50.8 
 
24.6 
 
21.5 
 
3.1 
3.2308 .89738 
Grace period for loans is 1-30 days 
 
13.8 
 
35.4 
 
29.2 
 
18.5 
 
3.1 
 
3.3846 
 
1.04122 
Grace period for loans is over 30 days 
 
0 
 
56.9 
 
43.1 
 
0 
 
0 3.5692 .49904 
There exists no Grace period for loans 0 0 29.2 30.8 40.0 4.0154 .78047 
More than 20% of Loans are overdue 
 
0 
 
43.1 
 
53.8 
 
3.1 
 
0 
 
3.4000 
 
.55340 
Between 21% to 50% of loans are overdue 55.4 24.6 20.0 0 0 4.3538 .79904 
More than 50% loans are overdue 0 50.8 24.6 21.5 3.1 3.2308 .89738 
 
On average 76.6% agreed that loan repayment period in was done weekly with a mean of 4.3826 and standard deviation of 0.78393. 
A low percentage 35.4% indicated that loan repayment period was done monthly with a mean of 2.7826 and standard deviation of 
1.12386. A high percentage 64.6% and 64.7%  agreed that maximum loan duration was less than one year and exactly one year 
respectively with a mean of 3.6154 and standard deviation of 0.55035 and  3.9077 and standard deviation of 0.78508 respectively. 
75.4% of the respondents agreed that the loan repayment period was not more than one year with a mean of 3.2308 and standard 
deviation of 0.89738. A higher percentage of respondents 78.4% and 56.9 agreed that there exists a grace period for the loans with 
of less than 30 days and more than 30 days respectively with a mean of 3.3846 and standard deviation of 1.04122 and a mean of 
3.5692 and standard deviation of 49904 respectively. Moreover, 43.1% of the respondents indicated that 20% of loans taken were 
overdue while 80% of the respondents reported that between 21% to 50% of the loans were overdue. Additionally, 50.8% of the 
respondents indicated that more than 50% of the loans in the IFGs were overdue. The finding of the study that Informal Finance 
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Groups need to observe loan repayment period loan grace periods and overdue loans concurs with Schreiner (2008), who noted that 
loan repayment period and the frequency of repayments plays a great role in financial sustainability of the Informal Finance Groups. 
Furthermore, he articulated that the observance of the grace period that loans are given and the maximum duration the loans are  
given are vital constraints in the financial sustainability of IFGs. 
Table 7:  Model Summary for Loan Repayment Period Practices 
 
Table 7 showed the values of R and R² for the model fitted of 0.354 and 0.125 respectively. The R value of 0.354 portrayed a positive 
linear relationship between the loan repayment period and financial sustainability of Informal Finance Groups. The R² value of 0.125 
implied that 12.5% of the variation in financial sustainability was explained by the model Y= β0 + β2X2. 
Table 8:  ANOVA for Loan Repayment Period Practices 
 
An ANOVA was carried out which as from Table 8 showed the F statistic p value of 0.008. Since the p value of the F- statistic was 
less than 0.05, it implied that considering the simple regression model fitted above loan repayment period had significant effect on 
financial sustainability of Informal Finance Groups. 
Table 9:  Coefficients for Loan Repayment Period Practices 
 
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
T 
 
 
Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 2.032 .454 0 4.246 .000 
Loan Repayment Period .348 .114 .354 3.063 .008 
a. Dependent Variable: Financial Sustainability 
 
The results of coefficients to the model Y= 2.032 + 0.348X2 indicates that inventory management is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level of significance as shown on Table 9. This was because the p value of 0.008 was less than 0.05. The constant term implied 
that at zero consideration of loan repayment period, financial sustainability would be at 2.032, increasing the loan repayment period 
would increase the financial sustainability by 0.348. The finding of the study asserts earlier finding by Johnson, (2008), who opined 
that the longevity of an Informal finance Group is tied on the aspect of loan repayment period constraints and when this constraints 
are kept on check, then the financial sustainability of the Informal Finance Group is guaranteed. 
Conclusions 
From the findings of the study, loan pricing is positively related to financial sustainability. This implies that the higher the interest 
rates the more sustainable the IFGs are. This concurs with Steinwand (2011) who argues that the key to financial sustainability is to 
charge an interest rate that is high enough to cover operating costs, loan losses and interest and adjustment expenses. The finding is 
also in line with the financial systems approach as supported by institutions that stress the need for financial sustainability, efficiency 
and outreach (Snodgrass, 2016). This approach calls for microfinance providers to aggressively pursue sustainability through raising 
interest rates and lowering costs. The finding agrees with the observation by Sebstad & Chen (2016), who note that another way of 
maintaining sustainability is to increase profits by increasing interest rates. 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .354a .125 .116 1.07494 
a. Predictors: (Constant), loan repayment period 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 9.632 4 2.408 2.327 .008b 
Residual 69.784 65 1.0736   
Total 79.416 69    
a. Dependent Variable: Financial Sustainability 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Loan Repayment Period Practices 
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Loan repayment period is negatively related to financial sustainability. Longer repayment period reduces sustainability which can be 
attributed to cash inflows that are not so frequent. This is inconsistent with Schmidt, Seibel & Thomes (2016), who found out that 
coefficient of monthly and term repayment have positive sign. His argument is based on consideration that longer repayment period 
lowers risk of default. However this study found out that IFGs cash flows are affected by not so frequent in flows. Loan repayment 
period is an important aspect in the financial sustainability for the informal finance group’s project; however, lack of adherence in 
the loan repayment policies greatly affects the financial sustainability of the groups and creates possible conflicts that end up splitting 
the group members.  
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